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COPYRIGHT  FALSE  POSITIVES
Ben Depoorter and Robert Kirk Walker*
Copyright enforcement is riddled with false positives.  A false positive occurs when enforce-
ment actions are taken against uses that are not actual infringements.  Far from benign occur-
rences, copyright false positives inflict significant social harm in the form of increased litigation
and transaction costs, distortions of licensing markets through rent-seeking behavior, increased
piracy due to diminished public adherence with copyright law, and the systemic erosion of free
speech rights and the public domain.
To combat this problem, this Article analyzes the causes that give rise to false positives, as
well as their legal and social effects, and offers policy recommendations targeted at mitigating the
damage of false positives.  These policy recommendations include heightening the registration
requirements to include a substantive review of all copyright claims, the promulgation of regula-
tions dictating that copyright registrations be periodically renewed, and revision to the statutory
damage provisions of the Copyright Act in order to encourage litigation that would help to excise
false positives from the copyright corpus.
INTRODUCTION
In the geography of intellectual property law, copyright occupies a vast
and verdant terrain, but its borders are poorly marked.  The imprecise
delineation of individual copyrights is both an intentional feature and an
inherent flaw of the system: copyrights take minimal effort to acquire,1 but
the metes and bounds of the interests staked are often uncertain.2  Unlike
patents, where property rights are restricted to the claims contained in a suc-
cessfully prosecuted application,3 or trademark law, which only protects reg-
 2013 Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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excellent research assistance.  Contact: depoorter@uchastings.edu.
1 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (explaining
that only a “modicum of creativity” is required for a work to be sufficiently original for the
purposes of copyright protection). 
2 See infra Section I.A.
3 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 (2006).
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istered marks actually used in commerce,4 copyrights inure at the moment of
fixation5 without any procedural or substantive inquiry into their scope.6  As
such, an author7 of a putatively original work does not know, ab initio, the
amount of protected expression contained in this work,8 and so is unable to
assess accurately the strength of her property claims.9  Her original expres-
sion is protected, but the amount of originality her expression contains is
often not readily discernible from the work on its face.10  Similarly, it is often
difficult to determine what part of another author’s work is protected with-
out extensive analysis of the substance of the work and the circumstances
surrounding the work’s creation.  Every form of creative expression—from
the crudest imitation to the highest reaches of originality—draws in part
from prior art, both in form and in substance.11  As a result, the boundaries
of any copyright are vague and vulnerable to interpretation and second-
guessing.
Such lacunae, in combination with other factors,12 give rise to an abun-
dance of copyright enforcement false positives,13 where rights holders erro-
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006).
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed . . . .”).
6 Subject only to minimal review by the Copyright Office, works that are registered
within five years of their initial publication are presumed to contain copyright-protected
subject matter, and registration is considered prima facie evidence of validity. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 410 (2006).  Accordingly, in a copyright suit the evidentiary burden is shifted to the
defendant to prove the claim’s invalidity or to offer an affirmative defense, which dramati-
cally increases the cost of defending against a copyright action. Id.
7 In this Article, the terms “author,” “artist,” “writer,” and “creator” are used synony-
mously to denote the originator of creative expression, except where otherwise specified.
For a general discussion of the definition of authorship in copyright law, see JULIE E.
COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 116–43 (3d ed. 2010).
8 By statute, an author has copyrights in the expression, but not the ideas, contained
in her work.  17 U.S.C. § 102.  However, this idea/expression dichotomy is significantly
complicated by the fact that certain types of expression may be unprotected ideas on the
basis of the doctrines of merger, scenes a faire, and independent creation, as well as federal
regulations that prohibit certain types of common expression (words, names, short
phrases, etc.) from being copyrightable. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012); see infra Part I.
9 Conversely, uncertain boundaries also create notice problems for third parties. See
Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 4 J. LEG. ANALYSIS
1, 21 (2012); see also infra Sections I.A & III.A.
10 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part I.
13 In the economic literature on law enforcement, a Type II error or false positive
occurs when an individual who should not be found liable is mistakenly found liable. See
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J.
ECON. LIT. 45, 60 (2000).  In the framework advanced in this Article, copyright enforce-
ment false positives are instances in which copyright enforcement actions target activities
that are not infringements, or where the rights claimed are not actually possessed by the
enforcer.  As we discuss in more detail below such enforcement false positives become
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-NOV-13 11:16
2013] copyright  false  positives 321
neously believe that their interests in a particular work extend beyond the
bounds of what is actually protected.14  These false positives often motivate
copyright owners to seek enforcement of rights that are non-existent or
outside the scope of copyright.15  Such misguided enforcement actions
impose significant social costs.16  For example, automated enforcement tech-
nologies frequently send cease-and-desist letters or DMCA notice-and-take-
down requests17 for non-infringing uses.18  In theory, such actions would
seem relatively harmless given the numerous legal means available for
alleged infringers to contest these erroneous claims.19  In practice, however,
even if successfully challenged by alleged infringers, the litigation costs20
involved in correcting enforcement errors impose a burden on creative
actual “copyright false positives” when misguided enforcement actions remain uncontested
and are adopted by courts into law as standard licensing practices, in fair use determina-
tions, etc. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.  Moreover, copyright enforcement
false positives create high litigation and transaction costs and may deter potential creative
artists who cannot bear the prohibitive risks or costs. See infra Section II.B.
14 Similarly, copyright holders might strategically assert an enforcement claim (such as
a takedown notice) with the knowledge that the claim might well be outside of the scope of
their rights, but with the hope that the alleged infringer will not contest the claim. See
infra Section I.E (distinguishing between erroneous and strategic enforcement actions).
15 Focusing on copyright enforcement false positives, this Article does not make any
claims about the relative over- or under-enforcement of copyright law today.  Although we
point out how massive copyright infringements motivate some of the aggressive enforce-
ment tactics by right holders, the subject matter of copyright false negatives and the com-
parison between copyright false positives and negatives are outside the scope of this
Article.
16 See, e.g., Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540 (“Once a work has been written and published, any
rule requiring people to compensate the author slows progress in literature and art, mak-
ing useful expressions ‘too expensive’, forcing authors to re-invent the wheel, and so on.
Every work uses scraps of thought from thousands of predecessors, far too many to com-
pensate even if the legal system were frictionless, which it isn’t.”); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
332–33, 349–59 (1989) (discussing the administrative and enforcement costs of the copy-
right system).
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
18 See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, How a Single DMCA Notice Took Down 1.45 Million Education
Blogs, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 15, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-techno
logy/2012/10/how-a-single-dmca-notice-took-down-1-45-million-education-blogs/ (discuss-
ing how a copyright infringement claim on a single page questionnaire resulted in 1.45
million blogs being temporarily shut off).
19 For example, an alleged infringer can mount a defense based on the merits of the
claim (e.g., by asserting there was no copying-in-fact); plead an affirmative defense (e.g.,
the copying was fair use); counter-claim for a declaratory judgment that a copyright plain-
tiff does not actually own the rights he claims; etc. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 410, 512.
20 These include both the costs of litigating a copyright claim and the potential statu-
tory damages that would be incurred upon a finding of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
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expressions21 and the rightful exercise of public rights and copyright
exceptions.22
Second, and even more problematic, are instances where transaction
costs and risk aversion inhibit wrongly accused infringers from opposing cop-
yright infringement actions.  Such uncontested false positives contribute to so-
called “fared uses”23 and the development of industry customs where royalty
payments are expected for the grant of unnecessary, and possibly non-exis-
tent, rights.24  Even if an alleged infringer could afford to litigate, the high
statutory penalties that would follow an unsuccessful defense act as an effec-
tive deterrent against contesting such claims.25  As such, would-be defendants
are incentivized into settling overly broad or even spurious claims, which, in
turn, creates and perpetuates uncontested false positives.26  In this way, copy-
right false positives heighten fears of liability, and create chilling effects
21 Likewise, for intermediaries in the content distribution chain (such as websites that
host user-submitted content), it is far more cost-effective to simply comply with all DMCA
takedown notices than to assess the validity of each notice individually and risk exposure to
contributory or vicarious liability. See infra Section I.B.
22 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 546 (2004) (discussing the importance of exact
replication); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another’s Language?
Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 127 (Paul L.C.
Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter Gordon, Eldred and the Duration of Copyright] (consider-
ing a music historian’s need to collect exact copies of a song); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1591 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression]
(“Sometimes particular words are essential.”).
23 Compare Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 561 (1998) (arguing that allowing
copyright owners and consumers to freely contract under a fared use system in time may be
more beneficial to society than requiring new technologies to adopt to traditional fair use
doctrine), with Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use: Amending
Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619, 620 (arguing that fore-
closing fair use in favor of a licensing market is a “dangerous direction for copyright law”).
24 For example, the Summy-Brichard Company, a subsidiary of Warner Music Group,
receives approximately $2 million per year in royalty payments for licenses to the song
“Happy Birthday to You,” despite the fact that the song is most likely in the public domain.
See Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 335, 338–40 (2009) (arguing that the song “Happy Birthday to You” is not under
copyright).
25 Under 17 U.S.C. § 504, a prevailing plaintiff may recover statutory damages between
$750 and $30,000 per work.  In the case of willful infringement by the defendant, damages
of up to $150,000 per work may be recovered.  17 U.S.C. § 504. Courts are also granted
discretion to award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a copy-
right dispute.  17 U.S.C. § 505.
26 This effect is also exacerbated by the fact that most individuals are risk averse.  On
the asymmetric effect of uncertainty in copyright law, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887–92 (2007) (noting that risk
aversion and user caution create licensing customs that reduce the perceived scope of
permissible uses).
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among creative artists,27 for whom even the cost of settlement may be finan-
cially unpalatable.28
A third cause of enforcement false positives results from the difficulties
that courts experience when trying to distinguish between legitimate and ille-
gitimate uses of content by means of the same technology.  In the case of
these partial false positives,29 the deterrent effects of enforcement inadver-
tently spill over into legitimate activities.30  For instance, when targeting the
distribution of copyrighted materials among users of peer-to-peer (“P2P”)
file-sharing technology, courts effectively precluded people from using P2P
for lawful activities, such as fair uses or the distribution of non-copyrighted
material.31  By assigning intermediary liability to technologies that potentially
27 See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540–41 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[B]road protec-
tion of intellectual property also creates a distinct possibility that the cost of litigation—old
authors trying to get a ‘piece of the action’ from current successes—will prevent or penal-
ize the production of new works, even though the claims be rebuffed.  Authors as a group
therefore might prefer limited protection for their writings—they gain in the ability to use
others’ works more than they lose in potential royalties.” (citing Landes & Posner, supra
note 16, at 332–33, 349–59)).
28 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 411 (1999) (arguing that copyright
costs may result in artists abandoning projects); Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment as a
Check on Copyright Rights, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587, 598 (2001) (discussing the
costs of enforcing copyright); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 199–200 (1998) (noting that false
positives may result in millions of dollars in costs and deprive the copyright holder of the
productive lifespan of the work in question). But see David McGowan, Some Realism About
the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 445 (2005) (arguing the nega-
tives effects of copyright law are overstated).
29 The classic example here is of a dual-use technology, as described in the “Sony
Betamax” case, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  In that
case, the Supreme Court held that because Betamax recorders had legitimate time-shifting
uses, this exempted manufacturers of videocassette recorders from intermediary liability,
effectively providing immunity to Sony from infringing uses of the same technology. See id.
at 442 (holding that manufacturers of home video recording machines could not be liable
for contributory copyright infringement for the potential infringing uses by its purchasers,
because the devices also had substantial non-infringing uses).
30 For instance, in the case of blanket licenses or royalty payments imposed on con-
tent-carriers, partial false positives render legitimate uses more expensive (such as playing
public domain materials or recording home videos and original songs). See, e.g., Audio
Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (1992) (establishing royalty payment obligation for
importers and manufacturers of digital audio recording devices and media); see also infra
Section II.A.
31 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916, 922 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (requiring that non-infringing activities represent a commercially significant use of a
technology), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  In demanding
that the P2P service filter out all copyrighted material, the district court dismissed, in its
hearing, the potential concern about adversely affecting legitimate uses. See Brief of
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Napster, Inc. at 26, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 01-15998, 01-16003, 01-16011, 01-16308)
(“[W]hen in doubt, then block. . . . [I]f you overblock, so be it.” (quoting a statement by
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enable copyright infringement, partial false positives policies may chill invest-
ments in new inventions that also serve many otherwise legitimate
purposes.32
False positives in various guises are unavoidable in law enforcement gen-
erally.33  But a number of structural factors make the issue of false positives
acute in the area of copyright law.
First, the symbiotic34 relationship between copyright law and technology
produces uncertainty as to the correct allocation of rights between consum-
ers, copyright holders, and the public domain.35  As new technologies have
evolved, the distribution system for copyrighted materials has grown to
include decentralized, pseudonymous networks of media businesses, technol-
ogy companies, paying customers, and piratical free riders.36  Within these
networks, the legal question of who should bear the burden for copyright
infringement is currently unsettled, and the fact-intensive nature of many
copyright rules create an extra layer of uncertainty.37  A landscape rife with
the District Court for the Northern District of California during a hearing on May 3,
2001)); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003) (confirm-
ing burden on file-sharing technology sites to produce evidence of actual substantially non-
infringing uses of its services).  Conversely, in Sony, the Supreme Court held that because
Betamax recorders had legitimate time-shifting uses, this exempted manufacturers of vide-
ocassette recorders from intermediary liability, effectively providing immunity to Sony
from infringing uses of the same technology. See supra note 29 (discussing Sony Corp. of
Am., 464 U.S. 417).
32 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 891, 937 (presenting evidence of the chilling effect of copyright lawsuits and statutory
damages on investments in technology innovation involving copyrighted content on the
basis of interviews with innovators and investors). See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005) (expressing “concern that imposing
liability, not only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for
unlawful use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies”).  This concern
is expressed in the various briefs in recent litigation involving file-sharing web sites. See,
e.g., Brief for Consumer Electronics Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 1, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480); Brief for Emerging
Technology Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19–25, Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480); Brief for Inno-
vation Scholars and Economists as Amici Curiae at 15–20, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480); Brief for Intel Corporation as
Amicus Curiae at 20–22, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (No. 04-480).
33 On the trade-offs involved in law enforcement, see generally Nuno Garoupa, The
Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURVEYS 267 (1997) (describing the economic
perspective on deterrence).
34 Some partisans from traditional copyright industries such as book or newspaper
publishing might characterize the relationship as more parasitic than symbiotic.
35 See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1850–51 (2009).
36 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Innocent Megaupload User Asks Court to Release Secret Raid
Documents, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2012 5:40 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-pol-
icy/2012/10/innocent-megaupload-user-asks-court-to-release-secret-raid-documents/.
37 One example is the fair use exception. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–107 (2006).
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legal uncertainty is fertile ground for overextended claims by copyright hold-
ers based on false positives.  Such claims increase the occurrence, cost, and
duration of litigation (in the case of contested false positives), as well as errone-
ously extend the scope of protection afforded to rights holders (as occurs
with uncontested false positives).  Similarly, uncertainty as to the nature and
likely impact of new technologies on copyright holders makes it harder for
courts to counter excessive claims by way of summary judgment and other
procedural safeguards.38
Second, copyright false positives result from an asymmetry between the
litigation costs and potential damages involved with copyright infringement,
on the one hand, and the modest benefits of most potentially infringing
activities, on the other hand.  Transaction and litigation costs have a perva-
sive effect in the area of copyright because the expected costs of defending
the right to use copyrighted material without permission (e.g., fair use) usu-
ally outweigh the more modest private value (but perhaps not the social
value) of the use of the material by the alleged infringer.39  This disparity
between likely costs and benefits inhibits wrongly accused infringers from
opposing copyright infringement actions.40  This, in turn, creates rent-seek-
ing opportunities for current copyright holders to engage in aggressive and
potentially overbroad enforcement activities.41
Third, the vast scale of copyright infringing activities online contributes
to the copyright false positive issues discussed in this Article.  File-sharing
technologies, social networks, and broadband Internet access in general have
decreased revenues for traditional copyright-based industries.42  This created
a Hobson’s choice in the mind of these copyright holders: either aggressively
38 See infra Section II.B.
39 In fact, the low private value, but potentially high social value of legitimate uses of
copyrighted materials (for example, in the classroom, news reporting, commentary, paro-
dies,) justify the very existence of some of the exemptions to copyright law—most promi-
nently the doctrine of fair use. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
Analysis and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1602–04 (1982).  What is often neglected is that it is often costly to exercise these
rights when challenged by a copyright holder. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The
Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2012) (linking the effectiveness
of legal rights to the right holders’ ability to exercise the right as a practical matter).
40 See Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Copyright Fee Shifting: A Proposal to Promote Fair
Use and Fair Licensing (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2159325, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159325 (proposing to
impose litigation costs on plaintiffs that reject reasonable license offers).
41 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Assessing the Academic Literature Regarding
the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (Aug. 19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=213
2153 (arguing that the vast majority of empirical studies find that piracy harms media
sales); MONEY, MUSIC, AND PIRACY, http://www.clickitticket.com/MoneyMusicandPiracy
.asp (last updated 2011) (documenting U.S. music industry sales and piracy statistics). But
see Joel Waldfogel, The Four P’s of Digital Distribution in the Internet Era: Piracy, Pricing, Pie-
Splitting, and Pipe Control, 7 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3, 12–15 (2010) (arguing
that new technology requires media firms to create new methods for revenue sharing).
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ramp up enforcement against all infringers43—despite widespread public
condemnation of the practice44—or face potentially devastating losses in rev-
enue.  In response, copyright holders have employed a number of tactics that
are prone to inducing false positives.  For instance, copyright holders have
increasingly turned to “algorithmic enforcement” where computer programs
(“bots”) scour the Internet looking for content that bears the markings of an
infringement.45  By using bots rather than human spotters, a broader range
of potential infringements can be detected at far less cost than is required for
manual enforcement,46 but at the expense of greatly reduced accuracy.47  As
such, algorithmic enforcement actions contribute to a wide range of both
contested and uncontested false positives.48  Further, the practical impossibil-
ity of detecting all infringements leads to overreaching by copyright holders,
both as a means of partially offsetting their losses and as a way to increase
deterrence by heightening fears of getting caught.  Finally, copyright holders
may feel justified in pursuing aggressive enforcement strategies49 because of
43 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901–02 (8th Cir.
2012) (upholding damages of $222,000 for infringement of twenty-four songs); Sony BMG
Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116–17 (D. Mass. 2010) (reducing jury
statutory damage award of $22,500 per work down to $2,250 on the grounds that the jury
award was grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of statutory damages for
copyright violations and remanding for reconsideration of the remittitur motion),
remanded to 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1902 (D. Mass. Aug 23, 2012) (reinstating initial jury award).
44 See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1264 (2011)
(“[T]he massive litigation against teenagers and college students has proven to be much
more controversial—perhaps, in part, because the general public identifies somewhat with
copying music in one’s home, especially by individuals living under the same roof.”).
45 For example, a copyright enforcement program might compare the “fingerprints”
of audiovisual content available online to a reference database of protected content and, if
the program determines that the online content is similar, an automated takedown notice
would be issued to the website hosting the content. See Geeta Dayal, The Algorithmic Copy-
right Cops: Streaming Videos Robotic Overlords, WIRED (Sept. 6, 2012 6:00 AM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/streaming-videos-robotic-overlords-algorithmic-copy
right-cops/all/ (describing automated copyright systems that search for copyrighted mate-
rial in real time).
46 See generally Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 712 (2011) (discussing the limitations of technological copyright
enforcement on a mass scale).
47 For instance, the fair use exception is based on a balancing test of four context-
specific factors that must be applied on a case-by-case basis. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
This test is, by its very nature, difficult to reduce to a set of instructions that could be
applied by an automated process. See Bridy, supra note 46, at 712 (“[T]he DMCA can be
understood as a mechanism for simultaneously scaling up online copyright enforcement
and scaling back online copyright liability . . . .”); cf. Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 347–48 (2005) (discussing the absence of the role
of users in copyright doctrine); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copy-
right, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (2005) (discussing disproportionate impact of copyright
remedies on independent artists).
48 See infra Section II.A.
49 Such as in the case of a false positive.
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a deep sense of injustice that comes from the perception (true or not) that
technology companies and their users are benefitting from mass infringe-
ment.50  In each of these instances, the economics of copyright enforcement
contribute to a heightened number of false positives.  In sum, copyright
enforcement in the digital era faces an unprecedented problem relating to
the frequency and severity of false positives.
False positives imperil the legitimate property interests of rights holders
by diminishing public respect for, and adherence to, copyright law.  Copy-
right law is now an arena of stirring public controversy and contention.  In
the past, disputes over the scope and strength of copyrights were fought pri-
marily between business entities, but now the number of partisans involved in
the copyright system has grown significantly to include hardware manufactur-
ers, software developers, website operators, search engines, end users, etc.
Given that the interests of many of these groups are diametrically opposed,51
there is a pressing need—from a business, legal, and normative perspective—
for greater clarity as to the metes and bounds of copyright protection.
Unfortunately, false positives have the exact opposite effect: they undermine
the legitimacy of copyright law,52 misallocate resources and rights between
creators, owners, and consumers, and generally add heat instead of light to
an already inflamed public debate.53
To combat the growing problem of copyright false positives this Article
offers various policy recommendations targeted at reducing the number of
false positives and mitigating the damage they cause: (A) heightening regis-
tration requirements to include a substantive review of all copyright claims to
be registered (these heightened requirements would not affect the substan-
tive scope of copyright protection,54 but rather would create a procedural
safeguard to diminish the number of questionable copyright claims ending
up in court55); (B) promulgating regulations that require periodic renewal
50 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154–57 (9th Cir.
2007) (involving claims brought by an adult entertainment magazine against a search
engine for direct and contributory infringement for the creation of thumbnail images
derived from its copyrighted photographs).
51 To say nothing of the interests of the growing number of organizations opposed to
any form of copyright enforcement at all. See, e.g., UNITED STATES PIRATES PARTY, http://
uspirates.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013); THE PIRATE BAY, https://thepiratebay.sx/
about.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (website for the world’s largest bittorrent tracker that
began as a Swedish anti-copyright organization).
52 For example, scholars have documented the widening gap between social norms
and copyright law, especially in the context of P2P file sharing. See generally Depoorter et
al., supra note 44; Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 591–601 (2006) (comparing the three camps into which “law and eco-
nomics of norms” scholars fall in their analyses of how law influences social norms).
53 See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
61 (2002).
54 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
55 Registration with the Copyright Office is a prerequisite to filing an infringement
claim in federal court. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006).
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of copyright registration; and (C) revising the statutory damage provisions56
in order to incentivize more copyright defense, thereby reducing the number
of uncontested false positives.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the various causes of
copyright false positives.  Part II reflects on the effect of copyright false posi-
tives.  Part III provides policy recommendations.
I. FALSE POSITIVES IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
Law enforcement is necessarily imperfect.  In all areas of law, enforce-
ment is likely to be plagued by factors that prevent enforcement from occur-
ring at the socially optimal level.57  For example, virtually all areas of law are
constrained by a scarcity of resources and political limitations on enforce-
ment.  Sometimes imperfect enforcement will lead to false negatives (type I
errors) where no enforcement takes place.58  At other times, imperfect
enforcement will involve false positives (type II errors), where enforcement
takes place without it being justified.59  The relative frequency and severity of
false positives and negatives depends on the type of concrete obstacles that
plague enforcement.  For instance, in the area of criminal law, public prose-
cutors with insufficient budget are likely to generate many false negatives.
Similarly, in tort law, if victims do not have the financial means or incentives
to sue, there will be under-enforcement.
In copyright law there is a widespread perception, especially among con-
tent industries, that copyright infringements are rampant and that new, digi-
tal technologies have complicated enforcement.  At the same time, however,
attempts to halt infringements have proved controversial and generated neg-
ative reactions.60  As a result, copyright enforcement has become an area of
stirring controversy.
While content industry representatives understand the issue to be under-
enforcement and false negatives, this Article asserts that copyright holders
either misunderstand or choose to ignore the detrimental effect of enforcing
false positives.  A number of structural factors make the issue of false positives
especially acute in the area of copyright law.
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 504. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009)
(discussing copyright damages reform).
57 To be sure, a “socially optimal” level of enforcement is subject to various
benchmarks—e.g., utilitarian, fairness, distributive justice, etc.  The main point is that no
matter what the normative goal is, complicating factors are likely to drive a wedge between
the optimal and actual level of enforcement.
58 See Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1285; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 13, at 60.
59 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 13, at 60.
60 See Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1277–82 (providing empirical evidence of
enforcement backlash among file sharers).
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A. Uncertainty in Copyright Law
While copyrights are easily obtained—requiring merely fixation and a
modicum of creativity61—the boundaries of a copyright are difficult to ascer-
tain.  The resulting legal uncertainty makes it difficult for copyright holders
and the public to predict, ex ante, how courts will apply the law to a set of
facts.  This uncertainty is a major contributing factor to the occurrence of
copyright enforcement of false positives.  As such, any attempt to ameliorate
the issue of false positives must begin with an understanding of the various
causes of copyright uncertainty.
First, as a general matter, boundary issues are widespread in intellectual
property law.  Because intellectual property rights involve intangible subject
matter, the metes and bounds of the rights are more abstract.62  As opposed
to real property where land surveys, title registration, and title insurance
reduce ambiguity and potential boundary disputes,63 intellectual property
boundaries are never fully transparent ex ante, particularly the boundaries of
copyrights.64  As commentators have observed, “Copyright boundaries
depend in part on audience reaction to an expressive work.  While copying
of the entirety of a copyrighted work typically crosses the infringement line, it
is often difficult to determine the protection of components or nonliteral
elements of a copyrighted work.”65
Second, within the realm of intellectual property, copyright law involves
an additional layer of uncertainty.  Unlike patents, where property rights are
restricted to the claims contained in a successfully prosecuted application,66
or trademark law, which only protects registered marks actually used in com-
61 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (holding that
only a “modicum of creativity” is required for a work to be sufficiently original for the
purposes of copyright protection). 
62 See Menell & Meurer, supra note 9, at 21 (citing ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW DIGITAL AGE 549–52 (6th ed. 2012)).
63 Id. at 15 (“A land developer typically has little trouble identifying property rights
and property owners who might credibly assert a claim against a proposed project.  The
tangible, geographic, and rivalrous characteristics of land, as well as the precision of land
claims and the availability of public recording systems and related institutions (such as
finance and title insurance), provide relatively reliable and inexpensive means for verifying
potential property conflicts.”).
64 See id.
65 Id. at 21 (citing MERGES ET AL., supra note 62) (arguing that a similar issue presents
itself in trademark law where a mark is infringing if it creates a likelihood of confusion with
an already existing, valid trademark); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006).
66 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 (2006).  Scholars have noted the unique difficulties with
effective disclosure in the patent system. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 32–34
(2008) (discussing the similarities and differences between patents and tangible property);
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 551 (2009) (arguing that ineffec-
tive disclosure is detrimental to economic competition and innovation); Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142–43 (2006) (noting that knowledge
of disclosed patents is required for liability, and thus provides an incentive for rational
ignorance of prior art).
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merce,67 copyrights inure at the moment of fixation68 without any procedu-
ral or substantive inquiry into their scope.69  To apply a term used by Peter
Menell and Michael Meurer, copyright law does not provide “deed” informa-
tion to the involved parties.70  The absence of factual information relating to
the actual resource boundaries of the protected work amplifies the potential
uncertainty involved with copyright protection and the correct enforcement
of these rights.  As such, an author of a putatively original work does not
know, ab initio, the amount of protected expression contained in her work,71
and so is unable to assess accurately the strength of her property claims.72
Her original expression is protected, but the amount of originality her
expression contains is often not readily discernible from the work on its
face.73  Similarly, it is often difficult to determine what part of another
author’s work is protected without extensive analysis of the substance of the
work and the circumstances surrounding the work’s creation.  Every form of
creative expression—from the crudest imitation to the highest reaches of
originality—draws in part from prior art, both in form and substance.74
Indeed, when it comes to determining the precise boundaries of another’s
67 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006).
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed . . . .”).
69 Subject only to minimal review by the Copyright Office, works that are registered
within five years of their initial publication are presumed to contain copyright protected
subject matter and registration is considered “prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright.”  17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006).  As such, in a copyright suit the evidentiary burden is
shifted to the defendant to prove the claim’s invalidity or to offer an affirmative defense,
which dramatically increases the cost of defending against a copyright action.
70 See Menell & Meurer, supra note 9, at 7.
71 By statute, an author has copyrights in the expression, but not the ideas, contained
in her work.  17 U.S.C. § 102.  However, this idea/expression dichotomy is significantly
complicated by the fact that certain types of expression may be unprotected ideas on the
basis of the doctrines of merger, scenes a faire, and independent creation, as well as federal
regulations that prohibit certain types of common expression (words, names, short
phrases, etc.) from being copyrightable.  37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012).
72 Conversely, uncertain boundaries also create notice problems for third parties.  On
information costs and notice externalities in intellectual property law more generally, see
Menell & Meurer, supra note 9, at 24.
73 For example, the amount of expression protected in that work may be very “thin,”
as is the case in works of non-fiction or history. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547–49 (1985) (finding a limited copyright interest in the
factual information contained in a memoir written by former President Gerald Ford).  Sim-
ilarly, a seemingly original work may nevertheless contain elements that infringe upon pre-
existing copyrights that the author appropriated without conscious awareness. See, e.g.,
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (holding that the song “My Sweet Lord” infringed on the song “He’s So Fine,” on
the basis of subconscious copying).
74 See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Intellectual (and
artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on the work of others.  No one
invents even a tiny fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.”).
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rights, knowing that a work is copyrighted is about as helpful as a medieval
sea-faring map marked “Here there be Dragons.”75
The boundary complexity in copyright law is perhaps best illustrated by
the difficulty of separating copyright-eligible expression from unprotected
ideas.  Take, for example, the possibility of different interpretations in the
classic law school hypothetical of Romeo and Juliet v. West Side Story.76  On the
one hand, if Shakespeare were alive today, some courts would likely find that
he holds copyright to the written text of the play Romeo and Juliet, but not to
the idea of a dramatic work about a tragic romance between teenagers.  On
the other hand, as a leading commentator argues, the issue is that West Side
Story’s “essential sequence of events, as well as the interplay of the characters,
[is] straight out of ‘Romeo and Juliet.’”77  The fact that “not all courts would
agree”78 on this fundamental demarcation issue, illustrates the degree of
uncertainty in copyright law.79  Moreover, the idea/expression dichotomy is
further complicated by the fact that certain types of expression may be
unprotectable ideas because of the doctrines of merger, sce`nes a` faire and
independent creation, as well as federal regulations that prohibit certain
types of common expression (words, names, short phrases, etc.) from being
copyrightable.80
Third, boundary uncertainties in copyright are compounded by the
unique relationship between copyright law and new technology.  Whenever
new technological applications (software, storage, recording, playback sys-
tems, etc.) enable novel ways to enjoy copyrighted content, difficult questions
arise about the legal status of a new technology or users’ actions.  Thus, the
history of copyright case law is replete with disputes involving the legitimacy
of new uses of content by way of new technologies.  Time after time, techno-
logical advancements (piano rolls, printing press, photography, photocopy-
ing, video recording, DVR technology, file-sharing systems, cloud technology,
etc.) have raised difficult questions regarding the scope and application of
75 See JAMES A. OWEN, HERE, THERE BE DRAGONS (2007) (a fictional novel where three
main characters are assigned to be caretakers of an atlas of all the lands that have ever
existed in myth and legend, fable, and fairy tale).
76 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 14 (2002).
77 Id. at 14 n.61 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 13.03[A][1][b], at 13–33 (2001) (alteration in original)).
78 Id. (quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 77, at 13–34).
79 See Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540 (“[At] a high level of abstraction, the first author may
claim protection for whole genres of work (‘the romantic novel’ or, more modestly, any
story involving doomed young lovers from warring clans, so that a copyright on Romeo and
Juliet would cover West Side Story too).  Even a less sweeping degree of abstraction creates a
risk of giving copyright protection to ‘the idea’ although the statute protects only ‘expres-
sion.’”); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 77.
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that blank account books are not subject
to copyright).
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the law to novel uses of copyrighted content.81  New technologies regularly
pose fundamental questions concerning definition (such as “Is this a copy?”),
copyright subject matter, the scope of rights, and the boundaries of the pub-
lic domain.  Consequently, the outcome of technology copyright cases is
notoriously difficult to predict.82  The reason for this is that technological
breakthroughs, by their nature, make it more difficult to apply existing rules
by simple analogy.  Moreover, when attempting to apply existing copyright
laws to new technologies, the social and economic ramifications are often still
uncertain.83
For instance, as new technologies have evolved, the distribution system
for copyrighted materials has grown to include decentralized, pseudonymous
networks of media businesses, technology companies, paying customers, and
piratical free riders.84  Within these networks, the legal question of who
should bear the burden for copyright infringement is currently unsettled,
and the ad hoc nature of many copyright rules creates an extra layer of uncer-
tainty.85  A landscape rife with legal uncertainty is fertile ground for overex-
tended claims by copyright holders, based on false positives.  Such claims
increase the occurrence, cost, and duration of litigation (in the case of con-
tested false positives), as well as erroneously extend the scope of protection
afforded rights holders (as occurs with uncontested false positives).  Similarly,
uncertainty as to the nature and likely impact of new technologies on copy-
right holders makes it harder for courts to counter excessive claims by way of
summary judgment and other procedural safeguards.86
To conclude, uncertainty about the allocation of rights between consum-
ers, copyright holders, and the public domain in copyright law, contributes,
in no small matter, to the existence and enforcement of false positives in this
area.
B. Enforcement Automation
As a result of file-sharing technologies, social networks, and broadband
Internet access, online copyright infringement now occurs on an unprece-
dented scale.  The resulting decline in revenue87 has created a sense of
urgency for traditional copyright-based industries to either aggressively ramp
up enforcement or face potentially devastating losses.
81 For an overview, see Depoorter, supra note 35, at 1832–49.
82 Id.
83 For example, emerging technologies create significant difficulties for courts when
they have to assess “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work,” as required by the statutory fair use test in 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
84 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 36.
85 One example is the fair use exception. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
86 See discussion infra Section II.B.
87 See Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (2006).
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The initial attempt to deter online copyright infringement—specifically
file sharing—by way of heavy-handed sanctions88 generated widespread pub-
lic condemnation of the industry’s enforcement practice and of copyright law
more generally.89  Perhaps in an effort to stem the negative reactions to the
seemingly punitive and disproportionate nature of such deterrence actions,
content industries have turned to enforcement models that increase the cer-
tainty (probability) rather than the severity of enforcement.
In doing so, copyright holders have employed a number of tactics that
are prone to inducing false positives.  For instance, copyright holders increas-
ingly turn to “algorithmic enforcement” where computer programs (“bots”)
scour the Internet looking for content that bears the markings of an infringe-
ment.90  By using bots rather than human spotters, a broader range of
infringing activities can be detected at far less cost than is required for man-
ual enforcement,91 but at the expense of greatly reduced sensitivity.92  As
such, algorithmic enforcement actions contribute to a wide range of both
contested and uncontested false positives.93
For example, automated enforcement technologies (so-called copyright
“bots”) frequently send out cease-and-desist letters or DMCA notice-and-take-
down requests94 for non-infringing uses.95  Copyright bots detect possible
infringement by comparing the “fingerprint” of audiovisual content available
on the web against a “reference fingerprint database” of protected works.96
In theory, such actions would seem relatively harmless on a systemic level,
88 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2012)
(upholding damages of $222,000 for infringement of twenty-four songs); Sony BMG Music
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116–17 (D. Mass. 2010) (reducing jury statutory
damage award of $22,500 per work down to $2,250 on the grounds that the jury award was
grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d
487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of statutory damages for copyright
violations and remanding for reconsideration of the remittitur motion), remanded to 103
U.S.P.Q.2d 1902 (D. Mass. 2012) (reinstating initial jury award).
89 See Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1277–78 (providing empirical evidence of
enforcement backlash among file sharers).
90 For example, a copyright enforcement program might compare the “fingerprints”
of audiovisual content available online to a reference database of protected content, and, if
the program determines that the online content is infringing, an automated takedown
notice would be issued to the website hosting the content. See Dayal, supra note 45.
91 See generally Bridy, supra note 46 (discussing the limitations of technological copy-
right enforcement on a mass scale).
92 For instance, the fair use exception is based on a balancing test of four context-
specific factors that must be applied on a case-by-case basis. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
This test is, by its very nature, difficult to reduce to a set of instructions that could be
applied by an automated process. Cf. Cohen, supra note 47, at 347 (discussing the place of
end user interest in copyright laws); Van Houweling, supra note 47, at 1538 (discussing
disproportionate impact of copyright remedies on independent artists).
93 See discussion infra Section II.B.
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
95 See, e.g., Brodkin, supra note 18.
96 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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given the numerous legal mechanisms in place to contest erroneous claims.97
In practice, however, the costs98 involved in correcting enforcement errors
through litigation are prohibitive to all but the most deep-pocketed defend-
ants.  Moreover, copyright bots that are programmed to enforce false posi-
tives can arrest free speech and the rightful exercise of copyright exceptions.
On September 2, 2012, a video stream of the annual Hugo Awards99
ceremony was interrupted during the acceptance speech of author Neil
Gaiman on the basis of alleged copyright infringement.100  Gaiman was
being honored for an episode he wrote for the television program Doctor
Who, and prior to the award being announced the Hugo Awards program
had shown clips of Doctor Who, as well as other TV shows that had been nomi-
nated.101  These clips triggered the digital rights management software used
by Ustream.com, the website responsible for carrying the Hugo Awards
stream, and the software automatically disrupted the stream.102  However,
the clips at issue had been explicitly licensed for use by the Hugo Awards.103
Even though Ustream and the officiating body of the Hugo Awards quickly
realized the bot’s error, the stream was not resumed, thus eliminating the
only live broadcast of the Hugo Awards available online.104
This incident stands as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of automated
enforcement technologies generally,105 and of the maleficent effects of false
positives on these technologies specifically.  Here, the copyright bot used to
identify the Doctor Who clips erroneously determined that the use was unau-
thorized and triggered an automatic interruption of the stream (i.e., it was
97 For example, an alleged infringer could, among other strategies: mount a defense
based on the merits of the claim (e.g., by asserting there was no copying-in-fact); plead an
affirmative defense (e.g., the copying was fair use); or counter-claim for a declaratory judg-
ment that a copyright plaintiff does not actually own the rights they claim.
98 These costs include both the costs of litigating a copyright claim and the potential
statutory damages that would be incurred upon a finding of infringement. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 504.
99 The Hugo Awards are the most prestigious awards given for science fiction. See
Hugo Award FAQ, THE HUGO AWARDS, http://www.thehugoawards.org/hugo-faq/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2013).
100 Doug Gross, Ustream Apologizes for Killing Hugo Awards Webcast, CNN (Sept. 4, 2012,
3:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/04/tech/web/hugo-awards-gaiman-ustream/
index.html; see also Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards,
IO9 (Sept. 3, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcement-
robots-killed-the-hugo-awards (detailing the evening’s events).
101 Gross, supra note 100.
102 Id.
103 Id. Even if the clips had not been used with permission, their inclusion in an awards
show ceremony would likely still qualify as a fair use.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 412–13 (2011) (discussing the technological and legal chal-
lenges of identifying copyright infringement in light of the transient nature of digital
content).
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“banned due to copyright infringement”),106 even though the Hugo Awards
had explicitly obtained permission.107  Though it is tempting to dismiss this
incident as mere growing pains for a new technology,108 the fact that the
owner of Doctor Who had, at the very least, constructive notice of when and
where the clips would be broadcast (i.e., they provided the clips to the show’s
organizers), and that the show’s organizers had obtained permission to use
the clips, suggests that automatic enforcement programs are currently pro-
ducing a large number of false positives and that incidents of copyright bots
unnecessarily restricting user access are pervasive.109  Moreover, some com-
mentators have argued that bots are incapable of making the fine-grained
distinction between fair and impermissible use that the Copyright Act
requires, and that their use eviscerates fair use as a practical reality110:
“[T]hese technologies do an end run around fair use . . . . Fair use still exists
in the books, in legal theory, but fair use does not exist in practice in a world
where companies that are relying on these databases of copyrighted works
can immediately shut off the public’s access.”111  While it is reasonable to
believe that automated enforcement technologies will become more accurate
over time, such technology can only address part of the infringement inquiry:
bots can assess whether a copy is similar to a protected work, but they cannot
determine whether or not said copying is impermissible, which requires a
fact-based application of the statutory fair use factors.112  Courts have not
determined any way to apply these factors in a mechanical fashion that would
lend itself to software application, and so even exceptionally accurate bots
would only be capable of assessing the quantity of protected expression cop-
ied, not the qualities of its use.113  As such, the trend towards greater reliance
106 Gross, supra note 100.
107 Id. This interruption also interfered with the First Amendment rights of the Hugo
Awards and the various honorees given the opportunity to make speeches.  While an analy-
sis of the free speech implications of algorithmic copyright enforcement are beyond the
scope of this article, other scholars have analyzed this issue. See generally Benkler, supra
note 28; Garfield, supra note 28; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 28. But see McGowan, supra
note 28, at 445 (arguing that the negative effects of copyright law are overstated).
108 See, e.g., Janko Roettgers, Vobile to Ustream: Don’t Blame Us for Your Hugo Awards
SNAFU, GIGAOM (Sept. 6, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/09/06/vobile-
ustream-hugo-awards/ (discussing which company was to blame for erroneously shutting
down the Hugo Awards feed).
109 See id.
110 See Dayal, supra note 45.
111 Id. (quoting Professor Kembrew McLeod, University of Iowa).
112 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
113 Compare Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)
(finding against fair use (in part) because, though a small amount of a book was copied,
the copied section was “essentially the heart of the book”), with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (finding that copying an entire televi-
sion program for purposes of time-shifting was fair use), superseded by statute, Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), as recognized
in Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that copying an
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on algorithmic enforcement will likely result in more false positive claims,
not fewer.  As bots become better at identifying the “fingerprints” of unau-
thorized copies, more works that bear resemblance to a protected work are
likely to be detected and trigger an enforcement action.114  Without a mech-
anism to assess whether a matching use is an actual infringement or a false
positive—which would require de facto human intervention115—automated
enforcement will result in over-deterrence, as permissible uses are swept up
in the same dragnet as piratical ones.
In sum, the nature and inherent difficulties of automated enforcement
strategies strongly contribute to the copyright false positive issue discussed in
this Article.
C. Mixed Use Technologies
A third cause of enforcement false positives results from the difficulties
that courts experience when trying to distinguish between legitimate and ille-
gitimate uses of content by means of the same technology.
The classic example here is of a dual-use technology, as described in the
“Sony Betamax” case.116  In that case, the Supreme Court held that because
Betamax recorders had legitimate time-shifting uses, this exempted manufac-
turers of videocassette recorders from intermediary liability, effectively pro-
viding immunity to Sony from infringing uses of the same technology.117
The Court argued that manufacturers of home video recording machines
could not be liable for contributory copyright infringement for the potential
infringing uses by its purchasers, because the devices also had substantial
non-infringing uses.118 Sony is an example of the difficulty of differentiating
ex ante between legal and illegal uses when making a final decision on the
legal status of a technology that has multiple possible uses.
The decision in Sony is of course more accurately described as involving
both a false negative as well as a false positive, since the producer of video
recorders were not held contributorily liable even though many users
engaged in illegal uses as well as legal time-shifting.  In many other instances,
entire photo to use as a thumbnail in online search results did not weigh against fair use
“[i]f the secondary user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use”);
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 22, at 1591 (“Sometimes particular
words are essential.”); Gordon, Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, supra note 22, at 127
(considering a music historian’s need to collect exact copies of a song); Tushnet, supra
note 22, at 546 (discussing the importance of exact replication).
114 Compare Bell, supra note 23, at 557 (arguing that allowing copyright owners and
consumers to freely contract under a fared use system in time may be more beneficial to
society than requiring new technologies to adopt to traditional fair use doctrine), with
Gordon & Bahls, supra note 23, at 620 (arguing that foreclosing fair use in favor of a
licensing market is a “dangerous direction for copyright law”).
115 See generally Bridy, supra note 46 (discussing the limitations of technological copy-
right enforcement on a mass scale).
116 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 442.
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however, courts have erred in the opposite direction, classifying dual-use
technologies as infringing despite the existence of legal uses as well.  For
example, in the first stream of file-sharing cases courts effectively wiped out
many legitimate uses (e.g., distribution of non-copyrighted materials or
licensed content sharing) of the pioneering networks by requiring that non-
infringing activities must represent a commercially significant use of a tech-
nology,119 or by imposing a burden on developers of peer-to-peer (“P2P”)
technologies to produce evidence of actual substantially non-infringing uses
of its services.120  Moreover, in demanding that P2P service providers filter
out all copyrighted material, the district court in the Napster case dismissed
the potential concern about adversely affecting legitimate uses, stating,
“[W]hen in doubt, then block. . . . [I]f you overblock, so be it.”121
Another example of partial false positive involves blanket licenses or roy-
alties imposed on digital recording media, such as Digital Audio Tapes
(“DATs”).  When Congress imposed a royalty payment obligation on import-
ers and manufacturers of digital audio recording devices and media,122 no
distinction was made between permissible and unlicensed uses.  The manu-
facturer of home recording equipment must make royalty payments to the
designated copyright collectives regardless of whether a buyer plans to use a
recording device for royalty-triggering uses or for a use that has no copyright
implications, such as playing public domain materials or recording home
videos and original songs.  Because manufacturers include this expected roy-
alty in the purchase price of their devices, such partial false positives render
more expensive legitimate uses.
False positives caused by mixed-use technologies are difficult to eradi-
cate.  In order to maintain a degree of flexibility—especially in light of the
emergence of novel technologies—copyright doctrine is more suited to
open-ended standards rather than very specific and precise rules.123  By con-
trast, attempts to apply different classifications to the various uses of a tech-
nology are likely to be frustrated because any specific use of a technology by
an alleged infringer is difficult to monitor and verify.  This presents a
dilemma for courts and policy makers, who must either make assumptions
about the typical use of a new technology or wait until the uses present them-
selves organically in the marketplace, at the risk of potential accompanying
harms.  In either case, false positives or negatives are likely to result.
119 Id. at 437–38 n.18.
120 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003).
121 Brief of Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Napster, Inc. at 26, A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 01-15998, 01-16003, 01-16011, 01-
16308) (quoting a statement by the District Court for the Northern District of California
during a hearing on May 3, 2001).
122 See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (1994).
123 Cf. Liebowitz, supra note 87, at 1 (providing analytical study of the relationship
between file sharing and record sales); Depoorter, supra note 35, at 1831 (arguing that
legal delay and uncertainty lead to a greater reliance on “self-help” by copyright owners
and users).
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D. Litigation Costs & Statutory Damages
The issue of copyright false positives is amplified by the litigation costs
and potential damages involved with copyright infringement.  Typically, for
an alleged copyright infringer, the expected costs of defending the right to
use copyrighted material without permission (e.g., fair use) vastly outweigh
the more modest private value of the use, though perhaps not its social
value.124  For example, it does not make sense in most instances for a docu-
mentary filmmaker to contest an alleged infringement action involving an
unlicensed five-second segment.  If the documentary has not been distrib-
uted at the time of the copyright infringement claim, then the filmmaker will
most likely purchase a license or drop the alleged segment from his movie
altogether—even if using the segment is very likely covered by the fair use
doctrine.  The alternative—spending thousands of dollars to litigate a fair
use case and incurring the risk of paying statutory damages and the plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees and costs—simply does not make business sense.  In this man-
ner, the disparity between likely costs and benefits inhibits wrongly accused
infringers from opposing copyright infringement actions.125
As a result, most users of copyrighted content will prefer to remove the
content or license it, rather than face the disproportionate costs of litigation,
even if the infringement claim is a weak one.126  This, in turn, creates rent-
seeking opportunities for current copyright holders.  Because push back
from accused infringers will likely be minimal, copyright holders might be
tempted to engage in aggressive and potentially overbroad enforcement
activities—strategies that will most likely generate false positives.127
In this manner, litigation costs and the remedial structure in copyright
are a pervasive cause of false positives.  Together, the high uncertainty in
many copyright disputes and disproportionate litigation costs bring about a
set of false positives that lead to over-deterrence.
124 In fact, the low private value, but potentially high social value, of legitimate uses of
copyrighted materials (for example, in the classroom, news reporting, commentary, paro-
dies) justifies the very existence of some of the exemptions to copyright law (most promi-
nently the doctrine of fair use). See Gordon, supra note 39, at 1602–04.  What is often
neglected is that it is often costly to exercise these rights when challenged by a copyright
holder. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 39, at 1313 (linking the effectiveness of legal
rights to the right holder’s ability to exercise the right as a practical matter).
125 See Menell & Depoorter, supra note 40 (proposing to impose litigation costs on
plaintiffs that reject reasonable license offers).
126 This contributes also to the credo in creative communities: “when in doubt leave
out.”
127 Spurious and overly broad claims cast a penumbra of doubt over whether works are
in the public domain or not.  In light of the potential costs imposed by the statutory dam-
ages regime of the Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), many persons accused of
infringement choose to settle rather than litigate, even if they believe a plaintiff’s claim to
be without merit. See infra Section II.D.
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E. Compensating False Negatives
The vast scale of non-commercial copyright infringement online has cre-
ated an existential awareness among traditional industries, such as entertain-
ment.128  Fearing a further decline of revenues, copyright industry
representatives responded to the perceived online piracy threat by aggres-
sively ramping up enforcement as a means to partially offset their losses and
to increase deterrence by setting examples for would-be pirates.129  Towards
this end, copyright holders have implemented enforcement strategies that
are prone to false positives.130
One contributing factor to the problem of false positives involves the
industry’s shift towards targeting non-commercial infringements.  Tradition-
ally, content holders almost exclusively targeted commercial piracy, but the
advent of widespread non-commercial sharing through P2P sites and tor-
rents131 necessitated a redirection to include non-commercial infringements.
However, whereas commercial pirates can be identified relatively easily since
there is a formal distribution channel and a focal point, such as a physical
pirate DVD mailing center or warehouse, private users might appear to be
infringing online even though they are merely engaging in fair uses.  As a
result, enforcement accuracy is lower in the context of digital, non-commer-
cial infringement settings because monitoring Internet traffic is difficult and
prone to errors.132  Further, copyright holders may feel justified in pursuing
aggressive enforcement strategies that push the boundaries of copyright law
because of the perceived injustice (correct or not) that technology compa-
nies and their users are benefitting from mass online infringements.133  In
128 See Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125–32 (2011) (tracing the history over the last two centuries of con-
tent owner claims that new technologies will destroy their business models).
129 For a description of the enforcement campaign, see RIAA, FAQ on Piracy, http://
www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); see also Rick Harbaugh & Rahul
Khemka, Does Copyright Enforcement Encourage Piracy?, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 306 (2010) (argu-
ing that new technologies that allow stronger controls over unauthorized use paradoxically
benefit consumers).
130 See supra Sections I.B. & I.C.
131 Torrents (also known as “bittorrents”) are a method of P2P file sharing that work by
downloading small bits of files from many different web sources at the same time, rather
than from a centralized server. See Dylan Love, Everything You Need to Know About BitTorrent,
The Legal (And Illegal) Way To Download Anything You Want, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2012,
11:28 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-bittorrent-2012-4.
132 See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, RIAA Versus Grandma, Part II: The Showdown that Wasn’t, ARS
TECHNICA (Dec. 16, 2007, 11:56 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/12/riaa-
versus-grandma-part-ii-the-showdown-that-wasnt/ (describing the settlement of a lawsuit
between the RIAA and a grandmother for songs her grandchild downloaded onto her
computer). See generally Melissa L. Morris, Note, How Streaming Audio and Video Change the
Playing Field of Copyright Claims, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 419 (2010) (discussing copyright enforce-
ment against P2P network users).
133 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 128, at 131–32; Cary H. Sherman, What Wikipedia Won’t
Tell You, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), at A27, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
08/opinion/what-wikipedia-wont-tell-you.html (discussing the decline of music sales since
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this context, industry representatives might deem aggressive and potentially
overreaching claims as insignificant given that under-enforcement of their
property rights (i.e., false negatives) is pervasive online.  Similarly, the per-
ceived need to compensate for the necessarily imperfect nature of enforce-
ment might help explain opportunistic enforcement actions that exploit the
costs of litigation and other strategies in which copyright industries err on
the side of bringing a claim when the use in question is ambiguous.
In sum, the economic costs of and obstacles to stopping mass online
copyright infringement might motivate some of the enforcement strategies
that further elevate the number of copyright false positives.  In the following
Part we examine more closely the effects of false positives on copyright law
and society more generally.
II. EFFECTS OF COPYRIGHT FALSE POSITIVES
A. Obstructing Creative Expression and Legitimate Uses
Copyright false positives can hamper free speech and the rightful exer-
cise of copyright exceptions.  The assertion of questionable property rights
on the basis of false positives threatens to disrupt the balance struck between
copyright and the First Amendment.134  As the Court noted in Eldred v. Ash-
croft, the purpose of copyright is to promote the creation and dissemination
of free expression, and the Copyright Act contains two provisions that protect
First Amendment rights: the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.135  As
provided by 17 U.S.C. § 102, copyright protection only extends to expres-
sions, while ideas may be freely communicated.136  Likewise, fair use limits
the extent to which copyrights may be asserted against uses of a work that
serve the public interest, such as commentary, criticism, and scholarship.137
Taken together, the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use provide “safety
valves” against copyright protection exerting too much pressure on free
the emergence of Napster and arguing that Google, Wikipedia, and others websites
engaged in “hypocrisy” and “[m]isinformation” in order to a defeat a congressional bill
designed to strengthen copyright protection online).
134 On copyright and First Amendment issues, see generally C. Edwin Baker, First
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Benkler, supra note 28; Marci
A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 317 (2000); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 28; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copy-
right Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rubenfeld, supra note 76.
135 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (“To the extent such assertions
raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are generally
adequate to address them.”).
136 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
137 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–21.
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speech,138 though some scholars have questioned whether these provisions
alone are sufficient to ameliorate copyright’s “speech burdening” effects.139
False positives corrode these protective mechanisms.  Claims based on
false positives attack the boundary between ideas and expressions and
encroach upon the rights reserved to the public by copyright law as well as
constitutionally protected speech rights.140  If left unchallenged over time,
these claims take on the appearance of legitimacy in a way roughly analogous
to an unauthorized tenant accruing rights through adverse possession.141  By
squatting on rights that are not lawfully granted, false positives cause a dimi-
nution of the public domain and simultaneously reduce the amount of mate-
rial that is per se available for use by others for expressive purposes.142  This
chilling effect is especially strong for forms of creative expression, such as
parody, which rely on imitation and copying for their efficacy.
Similarly, false positive claims—particularly partial false positives—nar-
row the range of activities that are considered fair use.  This contraction
occurs when courts inquire into “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”143  In fair use defenses, sub-
stantial weight is given to the existence of a licensing market for the use at
issue.144  If a market exists, then courts will view a fair use claim less favorably
on the basis that a prior licensee would not have paid for what they were
entitled to take for free.145  In this way, licensing agreements that arise from
false positives putatively validate the merits of the right holder’s claim, even if
the fair use analysis otherwise weighs heavily against it, or if the license was
obtained solely for reasons of economic expediency—i.e., “better safe than
sued.”146  As a result, uncontested false positive claims result in “doctrinal
138 See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970) (describing the mechanism through
which copyright law avoids offending the First Amendment); see also R. Terry Parker, Sold
Downstream: Free Speech, Fair Use, and Anti-Circumvention Law, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 299, 303–06
(2007) (discussing the tension between the First Amendment and copyright law in the
context of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions).
139 See Netanel, supra note 134, at 5; see also Baker, supra note 134, at 895–99.
140 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 28, at 386–94.  On the rights that copyright law reserves
to the public, see L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT
(1991) and Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325 (2011).
141 See Gibson, supra note 26, at 882 (arguing that acquiring a license where none is
needed is problematic because “the existence . . . of licensing markets plays a key role in
determining the breadth of rights, [so] these . . . decisions eventually feed back into doc-
trine, as the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use”).
142 See Benkler, supra note 28, at 358 (“[T]he First Amendment requires a robust pub-
lic domain.”).  On the importance of a robust public domain as a foundation for creativity,
see JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2008).
143 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
144 See Gibson, supra note 26, at 895–96.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 894.
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feedback” that diminishes the scope of fair use,147 and increase the instances
of “fared use.”148
False positives also lead to intrusions into the public domain, which
reduces the quantity of expression protected by the First Amendment per se,
and also creates limitations on fair use, which harms the qualities of said
expression.  In this way, false positives disrupt the balance between the Copy-
right Act and the First Amendment by shifting the fulcrum in favor of intel-
lectual property protection for information that is rightfully “free as the air to
common use.”149  This burden is not only borne by users of copyrighted
works—who rightly fear liability on the basis that their actions could fall
outside the bounds of fair use150—but also by new authors, who face similar
uncertainty as to the boundaries between their original works and prior
works created by others.151  An unavoidable measure of uncertainty is
endemic to copyright by nature and design,152 but false positives unduly
magnify this uncertainty by encouraging copyright holders to over-enforce
their putative rights153 and for users to avoid ambiguous uses for fear of
incurring liability.154  Second, copyright infringement suits based on false
positives impose a significant burden on new innovation and financial invest-
ment in copyright-based technologies.155  Specifically, in the case of partial
147 Id. at 887.
148 See Gordon & Bahls, supra note 23, at 620–21 (arguing that foreclosing fair use in
favor of a licensing market is a “dangerous direction for copyright law”).
149 See Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also Benkler, supra note 28, at 386–94 (arguing that the enclosure of information
through intellectual property laws abridges free speech).
150 Cf. Cohen, supra note 47, at 347–48 (describing copyright doctrine as predicated on
the absence of a user); Van Houweling, supra note 47, at 1535 (discussing disproportionate
impact of copyright remedies on independent artists).
151 See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540–41 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[B]road protec-
tion of intellectual property also creates a distinct possibility that the cost of litigation—old
authors trying to get a ‘piece of the action’ from current successes—will prevent or penal-
ize the production of new works, even though the claims be rebuffed.  Authors as a group
therefore might prefer limited protection for their writings—they gain in the ability to use
others’ works more than they lose in potential royalties.” (citing Landes & Posner, supra
note 16, at 332–33, 349–59)).
152 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
153 Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 43
(2006) (arguing that “pervasively distributed copyright enforcement . . . is both qualita-
tively different from earlier modes of discipline and normatively undesirable”).
154 See Depoorter, supra note 35, at 1837 (arguing that legal delay and uncertainty lead
to a greater reliance on “self-help” by copyright owners and users).
155 See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 32, at 91 (presenting evidence of the chilling effect of
copyright lawsuits and statutory damages on investments in technology innovation involv-
ing copyrighted content on the basis of interviews with innovators and investors). See gener-
ally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005)
(recognizing the “concern that imposing liability, not only on infringers but on distribu-
tors of software based on its potential for unlawful use, could limit further development of
beneficial technologies”).  This concern is expressed in the various briefs submitted in
recent litigation involving file-sharing web sites. See supra note 32.
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false positives156 this over-deterrence spills over into other legitimate activities
unrelated to any alleged infringement.157  For instance, when confronted
with the unlawful distribution of copyrighted materials among peer-to-peer
(“P2P”) network users, courts not only enjoined uses of these networks that
were found to be piratical but also lawful uses, such as the distribution of
public domain materials.158  This substantially disrupted the use and devel-
opment of P2P for legitimate activities.  The threat of incurring intermediary
liability dissuades investors from companies that are developing technologies
that could potentially enable copyright infringement (i.e., dual-use technolo-
gies that could give rise to partial false positives), even if piratical uses are
merely incidental to the technology’s primary and intended use.159
Overall, false positive claims disrupt the balance of legal incentives nec-
essary for the investment of labor and capital in new works of creative expres-
sion by discouraging fair use and creating disincentives to the development
of new technology.160
B. Increased Litigation and Transaction Costs
For many accused of infringement, a legal defense is well beyond their
financial means.161  Even for affluent defendants, overcoming the Copyright
Act’s strict liability standard is highly burdensome.  For example, litigating a
small copyright claim (for an amount in controversy of less than $1 million)
costs on average $303,000 through the end of discovery, and $521,000
through trial.162  Such high litigation costs, coupled with the risk of incur-
156 See supra note 29 (discussing the classic example of the “Sony Betamax” case).
157 For instance, in the case of blanket licenses or royalties imposed on content-carriers,
partial false positives render more expensive legitimate uses (such as playing public
domain materials or recording home videos and original songs). See, e.g., Audio Home
Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (1994) (establishing royalty payment obligation on
importers and manufacturers of digital audio recording devices and media).
158 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (requiring that non-infringing activities represent a commercially significant use of a
technology), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); supra note 31
(discussing the Napster District Court’s dismissal of the potential concern with adversely
affecting legitimate uses); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647–48 (7th
Cir. 2003) (confirming burden on file-sharing technology sites to produce evidence of
actual substantially non-infringing uses of its services).
159 See Carrier, supra note 32, at 891 (presenting evidence of the chilling effect of copy-
right lawsuits and statutory damages on investments in technology innovation involving
copyrighted content on the basis of interviews with innovators and investors).
160 See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 35, at 1830 (arguing that legal delay and uncertainty
lead to a greater reliance on “self-help” by copyright owners and users).
161 See Menell & Depoorter, supra note 40 (proposing to impose litigation costs on
plaintiffs that reject reasonable license offers).
162 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASS’N, Report of the Economic Survey (2011).
For copyright claims valued between $1 and 25 million, the average cost through the end
of discovery was $543,000 and through the end of trial was $932,000.  For claims above $25
million, the costs through the end of discovery averaged $1.22 million, and through trial
$2 million.  These calculated costs included outside and local counsel, associates, paralegal
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 26 14-NOV-13 11:16
344 notre dame law review [vol. 89:1
ring statutory damages and an opponent’s attorney’s fees,163 provide a strong
incentive for defendants to settle, even if the alleged claim is of questionable
merit.  In most instances, it is more cost-effective to simply capitulate.164  On
first blush, it would seem that a plaintiff should be similarly discouraged from
initiating a suit, but the potential rewards available to plaintiffs under the
statutory damage provisions in the Copyright Act change the arithmetic.165
From the perspective of a copyright holder, the downside risks associated
with litigation are comparatively small, insofar as most claims will settle, and
for claims that proceed the plaintiff will enjoy a significant procedural advan-
tage—the defendant will have to overcome a prima facie presumption that
the copyright is valid.166  If the plaintiff wins, they will be entitled to either
actual or statutory damages (their choice), as well as recovery of all their
attorney’s fees and costs.167  Only if the defendant prevails will the plaintiff
face potential losses.168  So, from an economic perspective, copyright holders
have an incentive to attempt to enforce their interests as broadly as possible,
as the foreseeable rewards exceed the accompanying risks.169  This calcula-
tion is what has given rise to the phenomenon of “copyright trolling,”170 as
services, travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court reporters, copies, couriers,
exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, translators, surveys, jury advisors,
and similar expenses, but were exclusive of judgments and damage awards.  Id.
163 Under 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), a prevailing plaintiff may recover statutory damages
between $750 and $30,000 per work.  In the case of willful infringement by the defendant,
damages of up to $150,000 per work may be recovered. Id. Courts are also granted discre-
tion to award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a copyright
dispute.  17 U.S.C. § 505.
164 Cf. Cohen, supra note 47, at 347 (arguing that users play two important roles in the
copyright system by receiving copyrighted works and by becoming authors themselves);
Van Houweling, supra note 47, at 1535 (discussing disproportionate impact of copyright
remedies on independent artists).
165 Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff in an infringement action may elect, at any
time before final judgment, to receive an award of statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412,
504, 505.  At the court’s discretion any amount between $750 and $150,000 per infringed
work may be awarded, though the upper end of this spectrum (between $30,000 and
$150,000) is reserved for “willful infringers.” Id.  Although Congress intended this designa-
tion to only apply to “exceptional cases,” courts have generally interpreted “willfulness”
broadly. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 480–91 (presenting numerous
examples of arbitrary, inconsistent, and excessive statutory damage awards).  The prevail-
ing party is also entitled to recovery of their attorney’s fees and costs.  17 U.S.C. § 505.
166 17 U.S.C. § 410.
167 17 U.S.C. § 505.
168 A defendant can also recover attorney’s fees and costs if they prevail in a lawsuit. Id.
169 See, e.g., James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copy-
right Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 79 (2012) (“To
supplement profits from copyrighted works, copyright holders have devised a mass-litiga-
tion model to monetize, rather than deter, infringement[,] . . . utiliz[ing] the threat of
outlandish damage awards to force alleged infringers into quick settlements.”).
170 See id. at 86 (explaining that a copyright troll is an owner of a valid copyright who
brings an infringement action “not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or supple-
mental revenue stream”); see, e.g., Third Degree Films v. Does 1–47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 190
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well as a proliferation of uncontested false positives.  Such uncontested false
positives contribute to a normative shift within copyright industries towards
“fared uses,”171 and likewise have a distorting effect on the market for copy-
right licenses.  Defendants threatened with litigation over a false positive are
induced into licensing the underlying work, even if this license is unnecessary
or conveys non-existent rights.172  This, in turn, leads to the false positive
taking on a sheen of legitimacy, as the copyright holder can point to previous
settlement agreements as proof of the validity of their claim in future litiga-
tion.173  This, in turn, leads to rent-seeking by copyright holders, driving up
the transaction costs for licensees on the basis of artificial demand.174  Like-
wise, for intermediaries in the content distribution chain (such as websites
that host user-submitted content) it is far more cost-effective to simply com-
ply with all DMCA takedown notices rather than to assess the validity of each
notice individually.175  In this way, copyright false positives incentivize weak
claims by copyright holders, heighten fears of liability, and create risk-aver-
sion and chilling effects among creative artists,176 for whom even the cost of
licensing may be financially unpalatable.177
C. Weakening Copyright Adherence
Enforcement false positives create a perception that copyright law
reaches beyond reasonable boundaries and serves private but not public
(D. Mass. 2012); see also Shyam Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (explaining how copyright trolls exploit the market for
copyright claims); Christopher M. Swartout, Comment, Toward a Regulatory Model of Internet
Intermediary Liability: File-Sharing and Copyright Enforcement, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 499,
509–10 (2011) (describing the business model used by copyright trolls in the adult
entertainment industry).
171 Compare Bell, supra note 23, at 557 (arguing that allowing copyright owners and
consumers to freely contract under a fared use system in time may be more beneficial to
society than requiring new technologies to adopt to traditional fair use doctrine), with
Gordon & Bahls, supra note 23, at 620 (arguing that foreclosing fair use in favor of a
licensing market is a “dangerous direction for copyright law”).
172 For example, the Summy-Brichard Company, a subsidiary of Warner Music Group,
receives approximately $2 million per year in royalty payments for licenses to the song
“Happy Birthday to You,” despite the fact that the song is most likely in the public domain.
See Brauneis, supra note 24, at 338–40.
173 See Gibson, supra note 26, at 887–95 (2007) (arguing that risk aversion and user
caution create licensing customs that reduce the perceived scope of permissible uses); see
also infra Part III.
174 This effect is also exacerbated by the fact that most individuals are risk averse.
175 However, the DMCA does not impose a duty on ISPs to affirmatively monitor for
infringement. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“[Section] 512(m) is incompatible with a broad common law duty to monitor or other-
wise seek out infringing activity based on general awareness that infringement may be
occurring.”).
176 See supra notes 27 and 151 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 28, at 411; Garfield, supra note 28, at 587; Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 28, at 166. But see McGowan, supra note 28, at 435.
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interests.178  When enforcement false positives target permitted uses, such
enforcement actions undermine the respect for and legitimacy of the copy-
right system.179  For example, copyright false positives give credence to com-
mentators who assert that politically strong entertainment companies control
copyright law.180  By diminishing public respect for, and adherence to, copy-
right law,181 false positives imperil the very property interests that rights hold-
ers seek to protect.  As the public becomes less deferential towards copyright,
the increased non-compliance prompts further aggressive enforcement tac-
tics in what ultimately becomes a vicious spiral.182  This spiral of escalating
infringement and deterrence might continue for some time since, in such a
polarized climate, legislatures are often reluctant to intervene.183  In the
meantime, litigation costs and friction will continue to drain valuable public
resources.  In sum, false positives undermine the legitimacy of copyright
law,184 misallocate resources and rights between creators, owners, and con-
sumers, and generally add heat instead of light to an already inflamed public
debate.185
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While copyright holders as a general class suffer harm from the effects of
false positives,186 the harm of false positives tends to fall disproportionately
178 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 184–87 (2004).
179 See Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1251 (demonstrating normative backlash
effect of stringent copyright enforcement).
180 See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the
Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 454 (2004) (arguing that
Congress has ignored the public interest in favor of a property right rationale in recent
copyright legislation); Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the
Copyright Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FINDLAW (Mar. 5, 2002), http://writ
.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html (arguing that the Copyright
Term Extension Act was passed in part based on large campaign contributions to politi-
cians by the Walt Disney Company).
181 See Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 63–65 (arguing that overreaching by copyright own-
ers has resulted in a public scorn for copyright law); see also Feldman & Nadler, supra note
52, at 577 (documenting normative intuitions of users of file-sharing systems).
182 See Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1264.
183 For example, an organized online protest where hundreds of websites “went dark”
for a day to protest the Stop Online Privacy Act ended consideration of copyright legisla-
tion by Congress in 2012. See Timothy B. Lee, Still Smarting from SOPA, Congress to Shy away
from Copyright in 2013, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 7, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/01/still-smarting-from-sopa-congress-to-shy-away-from-copyright-in-2013/; see also
Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 181
(2003) (discussing the effect of social forces on legislative action and drawing a compari-
son between copyright and environmental activism).
184 On the widening gap between social norms and copyright law in the context of P2P
file sharing, see Depoorter et al., supra note 44, at 1252; Feldman & Nadler, supra note 52,
at 589–91.
185 See Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 63–65.
186 See id.
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on private individuals and small business entities, rather than large content
producers.  As will be discussed below, the current system bestows significant
legal entitlements on registrants in exchange for very modest administrative
fees,187 and these entitlements shift significant information, litigation, and
transaction costs onto potential defendants and third parties.  As such, orga-
nizations that manage large copyright portfolios tend to benefit the most
from this system, as they suffer minimal upfront costs to gain access to a par-
cel of rights that provides significant market power and bargaining leverage.
As a result, these organizations have little incentive to lobby for changes to
the current regime; from the perspective of large portfolio owners, copyright
false positives are likely viewed as mere annoyances.188  However, for the sys-
tem as a whole, copyright false positives impose negative externalities that
have significant impact on less politically—and economically—advantaged
actors: independent artists, new technology entrants, and private individuals
and institutions availing themselves of fair use, among others.  As such, reme-
dying the problem of false positives would represent a net benefit to the cop-
yright system as a whole, in that it would excise erroneously protected works
from the copyright corpus, enrich the breadth and depth of the public
domain, and shift costs to the least cost avoider, the registrant.
To combat the problems caused by copyright false positives,189 structural
reforms of the copyright system are needed.  The policy recommendations
below seek to achieve three primary goals: reduction in the number of false
positives, reduction in the cost of discovering false positives, and mitigation
of the social costs that false positives impose.  Towards these ends, the follow-
ing structural changes would be helpful: (A) increasing the application
requirements and review standards for registration with the Copyright Office;
(B) adopting a rule of mandatory renewal of copyright registrations on a
periodic basis; and (C) revision of the statutory damages provisions to incen-
tivize litigation aimed at curing copyright false positives.
A. Heightening Registration Requirements
Though neither publication nor formal registration of a work is required
for copyrights to vest,190 registration is required in order to enforce these
187 The current cost of registration and recordation ranges from $25 to $220, with the
basic electronic filing priced at $35. See Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (effective Aug. 1,
2009), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html.
188 For example, the major entertainment and media trade organizations (such as the
MPAA, RIAA, NAB, etc.) are unlikely to proactively address the problem of copyright false
positives, as the remedy would likely lead to increased administrative costs, more litigation,
and the potential invalidation of some fraction of the copyrights currently held by their
membership.
189 See supra Part II.
190 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  Prior to 1978, copyrights did not generally attach until a
work was published with notice of copyright attached. See Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed Jan. 1, 1978).
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rights in federal court.191  According to existing law, if registration was made
within three months of publication of a work, or prior to an infringement
occurring, statutory damages and attorney’s fees are available to the copy-
right holder in a prevailing action.192  Otherwise, plaintiffs are limited in
their recovery to actual damages and profits.193  Further, registration within
five years of publication constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright’s
validity and of the facts stated on the registration certification.194  Taken
together, these entitlements convey significant litigation advantages onto
plaintiffs and largely shift the burden of proof to the alleged infringer, who
must put on evidence showing that the copyright is invalid or establishing an
affirmative defense for their copying.195  This procedural deficit, when con-
sidered alongside the fact that the Copyright Act imposes strict liability for
misappropriation regardless of an infringer’s intent,196 provides a strong
incentive for defendants to settle infringement suits regardless of the
strength of the underlying claims.
Currently, the Copyright Office reviews deposits for subject matter eligi-
bility,197 but does not undertake a substantive review of prior registrations to
ascertain what, if any, expression in the application is protected.  Copyright
registration is usually granted as a matter of course, so long as the applicant
correctly files their application and the deposited subject matter is within the
scope of copyright protection.198  As such, the issuance of a registered copy-
right certificate offers little guidance as to the extent of an author’s property
rights in the work, or even if the work contains protectable expression at
all.199  This process stands in stark contrast to other intellectual property
registration protocols, which require substantive review of the application
subject matter prior to registration.  For example, to register a patent, exam-
iners at the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) compare an applicant’s
invention against prior art and prepare a series of “Office action” memo-
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made in accordance with this title.”).
192 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504, 505.  Conversely, a prevailing defendant is also entitled to
recover their attorney’s fees.
193 Id.
194 Id. § 410.
195 Examples of affirmative defenses include fair use, laches, and copyright misuse.
196 See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177,
180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the song “My Sweet Lord” infringed on the song
“He’s So Fine,” on the basis of subconscious copying).
197 See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (“When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights deter-
mines that, in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material deposited consti-
tutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements of this
title have been met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certifi-
cate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office.”)
198 See 17 U.S.C. § 408.
199 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (holding that
the white pages of a phonebook did not meet the minimum originality required for copy-
right protection).
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randa that provide justification for why the examiner has accepted, or
rejected, the applicant’s claims.200
Though only de minimis originality is necessary to obtain copyright—and
often only a modicum of protection is subsequently provided201—authors
tend to consistently overestimate the extent of their property interests in
copyrighted work.  It is a rare copyright holder who does not suffer from
“that obsessive conviction, so common among authors and composers, that
all similarities between their works and any others [that] appear later must
inevitably be ascribed to plagiarism.”202  As opposed to a patent grant, which
serves a similar function for an invention as a deed does for a tract of real
property203—i.e., defining the borders that separate one claim from
another—copyright registrations serve little intrinsic purpose other than a
purely notary function of recording when and by whom a work was regis-
tered.  This, among the other reasons discussed in Part I above, leads to false
positives.
One way to remedy this problem would be for the Copyright Office to
undertake a heightened level of scrutiny during the registration process.
Under heightened standards, the Copyright Office would be required to
undertake a patent-like examination of the substance of the work seeking
registration by comparing it to prior art (e.g., similar works deposited with
the Library of Congress), and to make an initial assessment (roughly analo-
gous to a PTO “Office action”) of what elements contained in a submitted
work constitute original, protectable expression.  For example, suppose that
an author decided to write a screenplay about the struggles and ultimate tri-
umph of a boxer growing up in a working class neighborhood.  At first
glance, this play would be reminiscent of the films Raging Bull, Rocky, and
Million Dollar Baby, among many others.  Indeed, the new script and these
films would share many similar stock elements: exploration of the strains a
boxing career places on familial relationships, the struggle to overcome per-
sonal demons, a narrative arch that builds to a climatic fight scene that
encapsulates the protagonist’s struggle, etc.204  But the play’s script also con-
200 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006) (defining novelty and non-obvious subject
matter as conditions for patentability); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2002) (defining the process of
examination for the satisfaction of conditions for patentability); U.S. PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706 (8th ed. 2001) (reviewing
the examination, rejection, and acceptance of patent applications).  Trademark law also
requires substantive review of marks submitted for registration with the PTO. See generally
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006) (describing the trademark application and registration
process); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra, § 800 (outlining application require-
ments for trademarks).
201 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
202 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
203 But see Menell & Meurer, supra note 9, at 1.  For a discussion of disclosure issues in
the patent system, see, for example, BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 32–34; Fromer,
supra note 66, at 551; Holbrook, supra note 66, at 133–34.
204 As stock elements of the sports movies generally, these shared elements would be
unprotectable under the sce`nes a` faire doctrine. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,
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tains many unique elements that differentiate it from the prior works, such as
its characters, dialogue, literary style, etc.  If this work were submitted for
registration under the proposed heightened review standard, a Copyright
Office examiner would analyze the substance of the screenplay for original
expression, taking into account the literary and dramatic conventions inher-
ent to the work’s genre, the thematic and stylistic similarities that the work
bears to other prior works deposited in the Library of Congress, and the stat-
utory limitations of the Copyright Act.205  The examiner would then write a
report, based on this analytic dissection,206 that would include detailed bibli-
ographic and technical information about the screenplay, and provide gui-
dance as to what elements are likely protected (e.g., the playwright’s
dialogue) and what elements are likely not (e.g., the “preparing for the
fight” story arch, certain supporting characters in the drama, general boxing
terminology, etc.).  Then, when a copyright registration certificate is granted,
the examiner’s report would be appended to the deposited copy in the
Library of Congress and made publicly available for search through the Cop-
yright Office’s online catalogue.  Heightening the registration requirements
would not affect the substantive scope of copyright protection—e.g., copy-
right would still inure at the moment of fixation207 and would persist for the
same statutory duration208—but rather would create a procedural mecha-
nism to more accurately survey the metes and bounds of the copyright in an
individual work.
The benefits of adopting such a review protocol are numerous.  Substan-
tive examination of works at the point of registration would serve an impor-
tant notice function to both copyright holders and potential copyists.  The
examiner’s report would provide copyright holders with a basic chart of their
protected property interests, as well as what elements in the work are in the
784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the book Fort Apache and the film Fort Apache:
The Bronx were not “substantially similar beyond the level of generalized or otherwise non-
protectible ideas,” and thus the film did not infringe upon the copyright of the book).
205 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012).
206 This type of structural substantive review is similar to the “script coverage” reports
used in the motion picture industry, where studio readers summarize and evaluate books,
screenplays, and other dramatic materials for possible production as a movie. See, e.g., MAX
ADAMS, THE SCREENWRITER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 84 (2001).  It is also similar to the “extrinsic”
test undertaken by courts in the Ninth Circuit when assessing substantial similarity with
regards to the misappropriation element of an infringement claim. See, e.g., Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[One
test of substantial similarity is based on] specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.
Such criteria include the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter,
and the setting for the subject.  Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert
testimony are appropriate.”).
207 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (noting that only a
de minimis amount of originality is required for copyrights to attach to work of authorship).
208 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (affirming the constitutionality of
the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of copyright to the
life of the author plus seventy years).
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public domain.209  This information would allow for more targeted enforce-
ment actions, reducing the litigation and transaction costs of pursuing inva-
lid claims.  Conversely, guidance as to what components of the work are
protected would allow subsequent authors to better predict whether copying
particular elements from a work would subject them to liability for unautho-
rized reproduction or adaptation.
In addition, this protocol would reduce litigation costs and promote
judicial economy.  The examiner’s report would reduce both parties’ infor-
mation costs from the onset of a lawsuit, leading to quicker settlements and
fewer questionable copyright claims ending up in court.210  The examination
protocol would also aid courts in disposing of cases more efficiently.  For
example, while courts have the discretion to dismiss a misappropriation
claim on summary judgment,211 as a general principle such motions are dis-
favored on the basis that a showing of substantial similarity is a question of
fact “uniquely situated for determination by the trier of fact.”212  However,
courts have overcome this reluctance when sufficient evidence is offered in
pleadings that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity as a matter
of law.213  An initial assessment made by the Copyright Office into the scope
of copyright protection would provide significant factual information that
could serve as the basis upon which a court could decide to dismiss a claim,
both at the summary judgment and the initial pleading stages.214
209 While the Copyright Office’s factual findings concerning the scope of protected
expression would likely be given deference by courts in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, federal courts would remain the final arbiters of the scope of copyright
protection. See generally Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11 (1994) (discussing the applicable standards for review of administra-
tive agencies).
210 Registration with the Copyright Office is a prerequisite to filing an infringement
claim in federal court. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
211 See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding
summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that the action was premised “upon a
wholly erroneous understanding of the extent of copyright protection”).
212 Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that sub-
stantial similarity is a matter for the trier of fact); Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355 (same). But
see See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983) (“No special standard is applied in
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of substantial similar-
ity of expression in a copyright case.”).
213 See, e.g., Jason, 698 F.2d at 967 (upholding summary judgment on the ground that
no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity); see also Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358
(same); Durang, 711 F.2d at 142 (same); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
214 For example, a cause of action for copyright infringement requires, inter alia, the
existence of a valid copyright in the work allegedly infringed. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
Therefore, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted (see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)), a plaintiff must plead evidence suffi-
cient to establish a valid copyright interest.  “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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For the Copyright Office to perform a searching review of all copyright
applications would be logistically challenging, but nevertheless could be
achieved at a relatively low cost in comparison to the benefits conferred.
Though the patent examination system would serve as a model, the imple-
mentation of heightened copyright review would be substantially less expen-
sive and complex to administer.  With limited exceptions,215 such as software,
a review of pre-existing works under copyright would not necessitate exten-
sive scientific or engineering knowledge, as is required to examine and prose-
cute patent applications before the PTO.  Furthermore, since neither novelty
nor non-obviousness are precursors to copyright protection,216 a prior art
search in copyright need not be exhaustive, as the focus of the examiner’s
report would be on establishing what is protectable in the work under review,
not whether the work is sufficiently different from other works that precede
it.217  The additional expense right holders would incur in registering their
works would be offset by a substantial reduction in information, litigation,
and transaction costs associated with enforcing their rights.  Finally, a height-
ened protocol would improve the equitable balance between the parties in
copyright litigation.  The benefits conveyed on plaintiffs by virtue of registra-
tion (e.g., the potential for statutory damages and recovery of attorney’s fees
and the prima facie presumption of the copyright’s validity218) would be tem-
pered slightly by the additional costs incurred ex ante, and the procedural
deficits faced by defendants (e.g., a strict liability regime and the burden of
proving the plaintiff’s prima facie claim invalid) would be offset by a reduc-
tion in their information and search costs.
B. Periodic Copyright Registration Renewals
For heightened review to achieve the goal of reducing the number of
copyright false positives, the proposed registration requirements must be
applied to both works that are currently registered with the Copyright Office
as well as new registrations.  Without a mechanism to bring older registra-
tions under the purview of the new examination system, any false positives
555 (2007) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, heightened registration requirements and delineation of protectable from non-pro-
tectable elements by the Copyright Office would establish an evidentiary basis for a court
to dismiss copyright false positives on the pleadings, thereby significantly lowering the liti-
gation costs of copyright defense.
215 For example, analyzing a computer program to determine the scope of protectable
elements within may require specific technical knowledge. Cf. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying a three-part “Abstraction—
Filtration—Comparison” test to determine substantial similarity in computer programs).
See generally MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW (3d ed. 2006) (discussing
required technological knowledge).
216 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006).
217 Indeed, a work may be identical to a work under copyright and still qualify for pro-
tection, so long as the second work was independently created and did not copy from the
earlier work. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
218 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 410, 412, 504, 505.
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that existed prior to the adoption of heightened review would persist for a
very long—some would argue indefinite—period of time.219  This could be
achieved by the Copyright Office promulgating new regulations that man-
date that registrations be renewed periodically throughout the entire term of
the copyright, and that upon renewal the copyrighted work is subject to
heightened review, as discussed above.220
Traditionally, copyrights had to be renewed periodically to enjoy contin-
ued protection.221  Under the current system, however, there are no addi-
tional actions required for a copyright holder to maintain their registration.
Once a work is registered the entitlements that accompany registration222
continue for the entire term of the copyright.223  The proposed periodic
renewal requirement is not intended to affect either the duration of the cop-
yright term or any other substantive rights of the copyright holder—i.e., the
copyright in a work would endure for the full statutory term regardless of
whether or not registration is renewed.224  Rather, it is targeted at the statu-
219 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that that CTEA creates a copyright term that is “virtually perpetual”).
220 See 37 C.F.R. § 202 (2011).  The Copyright Office is authorized to promulgate regu-
lations under 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(f), 702 (2006).
221 Until 1992, the Copyright Act provided that the duration of copyright was divided
into two terms, the first term lasting for twenty-eight years, and a second term lasting for
twenty-eight years. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075
(repealed 1978).  In order to enjoy this second term of protection, copyrights had to be
renewed after twenty-eight years, and works that were not renewed would automatically
enter the public domain. See id.  However, Congress excised these renewal requirements
from the Copyright Act in 1992, creating a single term of protection that does not require
renewal. See Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264
(removing the statutory requirement that copyrights must be renewed after twenty-eight
years in order to enjoy a second term of protection).  Six years later, the Copyright Term
Extension Act (“CTEA”) extended the term to its current duration of life of the author
plus seventy years, or ninety-five years after publication for a work of corporate authorship.
See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (2006)).  In 2004, the Court held that the CTEA was constitutionally
within the powers granted to Congress by the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitu-
tion. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194 (holding that a twenty-year retroactive extension of copy-
right terms did not violate the Copyright Clause of the Constitution). See generally Michael
Jones, Eldred v. Ashcroft: The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 19 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 85 (2004) (providing background on copyright law and the CTEA and argu-
ing that the Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft should have been expected); Pamela
Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547 (2003) (arguing that proponents for constitutional limitations of
intellectual property law are likely to experience some success in the future, even if they
were unsuccessful in Eldred v. Ashcroft).
222 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504–505.
223 Id. §§ 302–304 .
224 The proposed renewal requirement addresses the procedural posture of copyright
claims rather than their substantive rights.  This is fundamentally different that the pre-
1992 renewal requirements, under which copyrights which were not renewed after twenty-
eight years automatically entered the public domain. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L.
No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
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tory benefits that accrue when a work is registered, specifically the prima
facie presumption of validity and election of statutory damages.225  Under
this proposed rule, in order to continue enjoyment of these advantages,226
copyright owners would be subject to re-examination of their claims by the
Copyright Office at regular intervals.
Periodic renewal would serve three purposes related to the reduction of
copyright false positives.  First, requiring that registrations be renewed would
serve an error-checking function, where the validity of a claimed copyright
would be tested in a quasi-adjudicatory proceeding.  This process would pro-
vide a mechanism for challenging uncontested false positives without the
need for litigation, and would serve to excise overly broad or invalid claims
from the copyright corpus.  Over time, this would have the effect of mitigat-
ing the distortion caused by false positives on the market for copyright
licenses, and would partially deter the rent-seeking behavior that the current
system of registration encourages.227
Second, periodic re-examination would separate the protected and
unprotected elements in a work, enriching the public domain and slowing
the overexpansion of claims into unprotectable subject matter.228  For exam-
ple, overly broad claims cast a penumbra of doubt over whether works (or
parts of works) are in the public domain.  Due to the severe liability imposed
by the statutory damages regime,229 many accused of infringement—those
standing in the shadow, as it were—are all but forced by economic considera-
tions to settle rather than litigate, even if they believe a plaintiff’s claim to be
without merit.230  In the aggregate, these settlements increase transaction
and search costs for all parties, and lead to significant deadweight losses in
copyright markets.231
Third, renewal applications and their corresponding examiner’s reports
would create an archive (similar to a registry of real property deeds) describ-
225 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504–505.
226 See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
227 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 187–91 (3d ed. 1986) (noting
that accidents will increase if there is an absence of adequate deterrence); see also supra
Part II.
228 See BOYLE, supra note 142, at 42–54. See generally Benkler, supra note 28, at 354
(arguing that the second enclosure movement minimizes the availability of information
and infringes on the freedom of speech).
229 See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
230 See Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 261 (1994).
231 Cf. WENDY J. GORDON & ROBERT G. BONE, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS
189, 196 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds. 2000) (arguing for the limited duration of
copyright protection and fair use work to reduce deadweight loss and other costs); Ben
Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 468–71 (2002) (arguing that even if copyright licenses could be
transferred without cost, strategic behavior by copyright holders could still lead to dead-
weight losses). But see Stan J. Liebowitz, The Myth of Copyright Inefficiency, 32 REG. 28 (2009)
(arguing that increases in copyright unambiguously increase economic efficiency and that
no deadweight losses occur).
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ing the metes and bounds of protected expression and identifying the own-
ers of individual tracts.232  This archive would make it easier to determine the
validity of a claimed copyright and in turn lower both transaction and litiga-
tion costs generally.  Such information would also aid judicial economy by
reducing the number of infringement claims based on false positives.233
In sum, the adoption of heightened review standards, coupled with a
registration renewal requirement, would provide significant benefits to copy-
right holders as a whole.  Over time, higher review standards would create a
repository of information that could be used by market participants to plan
licensing and enforcement, and by courts to expedite the litigation of
infringement claims.  While these heightened standards would increase the
cost of registering copyrights moderately,234 this expense would be substan-
tially outweighed by a reduction in false positive claims.  Moreover, this bur-
den would fall on the least cost avoider (the registrant), and would be
reasonable in light of the significant entitlements bestowed by
registration.235
C. Revision of Statutory Damages Provisions
Additionally or alternatively, revision of the statutory damage provisions
would help to eliminate false positives by incentivizing litigation to challenge
dubious claims.  Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff in an infringement
action may elect, at any time before final judgment, to receive an award of
statutory damages.  At the court’s discretion, any amount between $750 and
$150,000 per infringed work may be awarded,236 though the upper end of
this spectrum (between $30,000 and $150,000) is reserved for “willful infring-
ers.”237  Although Congress intended this designation to apply only to
“exceptional cases,”238 courts have generally interpreted willfulness
broadly,239 and damage awards are frequently arbitrary and excessive.240
Moreover, statutory damages are often far in excess of the actual harm to the
plaintiff or profits to the defendant.241  As a result, the specter of high statu-
232 Renewal requirements would also likely help to resolve the problem of orphan
works. See, e.g., Hal. R. Varian, Copyrights That No One Knows About Don’t Help Anyone, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at C3.
233 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 197–207 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
236 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
237 Id.
238 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 144–45 (1975) (stating that enhanced damages should be
available in “exceptional cases”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1975) (same).
239 See, e.g., Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257,
264 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that mere constructive notice of infringement was sufficient to
show willfulness).
240 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 480–91 (presenting numerous exam-
ples of arbitrary, inconsistent, and excessive statutory damage awards).
241 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn.
2008) (overturning a jury’s award of $222,000 in statutory damages for the infringement of
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tory damages, combined with potential liability for the plaintiff’s costs and
attorney’s fees,242 provide a strong incentive for settlement, regardless of the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims or the existence of a plausible defense, such as
fair use.243  This, in turn, provides fertile soil for the growth of false positives,
and a patina of legitimacy develops around overly broad or erroneous claims
that go unchallenged.244  In other words, the current statutory damage provi-
sions provide inadequate judicial deterrence to false positive claims.245
In this context, statutory damage provisions need to balance two policy
ends: (i) setting penalties high enough to discourage piracy; and (ii) provid-
ing sufficient incentives for defendants to challenge questionable claims.246
The question of whether (i) is achieved by the current law is beyond the
scope of this Article.  As to (ii), for a defendant, the monetary advantages of
litigating a claim versus settling are meager, at best.247
While a winning defendant would be entitled to the expenses they
incurred through the course of litigation,248 this potential reward does not
adequately offset the defendant’s risks.  If they lose, a defendant is subject to
statutory damages as well as payment of the plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s
fees; if they win, they are merely reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses,
twenty-four songs, whose actual value the trial court acknowledged as being less than $54);
see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 442–43 (providing examples of excessive
statutory damage awards).
242 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
243 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 443 (arguing that statutory damages
have a potential chilling effect on individuals and technology providers).
244 See, e.g., Brauneis, supra note 24, at 338–40 (arguing that Warner Music Group erro-
neously receives approximately $2 million per year in royalty payments for licenses to the
song “Happy Birthday to You,” despite the fact that the song is most likely in the public
domain).
245 Cf. POSNER, supra note 227, at 187–91 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that accidents will
increase if there is an absence of adequate deterrence); see also supra Part II.
246 While an action for declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate a claimed copyright
is theoretically possible under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a plaintiff in such an action
must prove the existence of a case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a) (2006).
In the copyright arena, this usually means that a party alleging a legitimate fair use must
make this use prior to seeking a judicial determination, else no case or controversy exists.
See, e.g., Solin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 05 CIV 4268 RMB/MHD, 2006 WL 223156
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (dismissing an action for declaratory judgment on the basis that
no case or controversy existed because defendant had not threatened to sue plaintiff and
had given permission to use its copyrighted work); see also William Patry, Declaratory Judg-
ments, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Feb. 2, 2006, 9:58 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot
.com/2006/02/declaratory-judgments.html. But see 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006) (providing
an affirmative cause of action for abusive DMCA “takedown” notices).
247 This is setting aside the question of what intrinsic economic value the use of the
copyrighted work has for the defendant, which may be substantial.  Rather, this argument
looks at the incentive structure that flows from the statutory remedies exclusively, irrespec-
tive of other considerations that may factor into a party’s decision whether to defend
against an infringement claim.
248 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
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but not for lost profits249 or compensation for detriments suffered to their
reputation or goodwill on account of the lawsuit.  Furthermore, while a copy-
right holder who engages in abusive or improper conduct in the enforce-
ment of their copyrights250 might be subject to injunction under the
doctrine of copyright misuse, this remedy does not provide for any pecuniary
compensation to the defendant.251  So, unless there are extenuating circum-
stances beyond financial considerations that necessitate litigation, defendants
have little, if any, incentive under the current system to fight if a reasonable
settlement is offered.252
Therefore, in order to incentivize defendants to continue litigation253
against uncontested false positives, this Article proposes that the statutory
damages provisions be revised to give courts the discretion to award reverse
punitive damages to prevailing defendants in addition to costs and attorney’s
fees.254  Such awards would provide an incentive for defendants to defend
copyright claims rather than to settle, insofar as they would stand to avoid
licensing costs and potentially to realize a financial gain above the amount
invested in legal fees.  Conversely, the possibility of incurring liability would
increase plaintiffs’ risk-aversion and lead to greater inquiry into the scope of
their copyrights, leading to a reduction in the number of overly broad or
questionable claims.  Taken together, this provision would have the effect of
reducing the number of false positives and arresting their growth: copyright
holders would be less inclined to push the boundaries of their claims if they
were forced to internalize some of the costs these actions impose, and
defendants would have incentives to help police the boundaries of copyright
claims, rather than allowing them to accrete through settlement.
It is worth noting, as discussed in Part I above, that not all false positive
claims are the result of rent-seeking or malfeasance on the part of copyright
249 Lost profits could be recovered by a plaintiff if they elected for actual damages
rather than statutory damages. See id.
250 Examples include attempting to extend the scope of statutory rights through restric-
tive licensing.  See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“The question is . . . whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”).
251 Furthermore, as an equitable remedy, the doctrine of copyright misuse focuses on
the conduct of the copyright holder as it pertains to enforcement (i.e., whether their
actions evince “unclean hands”), rather than on the merits of their underlying copyright.
As such, attempting to enforce a false positive through legitimate means would not likely
give occasion for a court to enjoin the plaintiffs for copyright misuse, even if their copy-
right was found to be invalid.
252 See Menell & Depoorter, supra note 40 (proposing to impose litigation costs on
plaintiffs that reject reasonable license offers).
253 See generally Steve Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit
and of Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 99 (1999) (offering an economic model that
accounts for the positive and negative externalities created by litigation).
254 For example, these damage awards could be structured to mirror the remedies avail-
able to plaintiffs, based on either a pre-established range (e.g., $30,000–$150,000) or calcu-
lated on evidence of actual harm incurred by the defendant (e.g., lost profits, decline in
goodwill, etc.).
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holders—many false positives arise from systemic factors.  As such, a reasona-
ble argument could be made that imposing liability on copyright holders is
unjust if such liability arises from factors beyond their control or knowledge.
However, from the perspective of the system as a whole, the copyright holder
is in the best position to assess the extent of their interests and to determine
the optimal amount of enforcement (i.e., deterrence) that is necessary to
protect these interests.  As such, the copyright holder is the least cost avoider
and, following the logic of law and economics scholarship on risk avoidance,
the adoption of a strict liability rule is more likely to result in a socially opti-
mal outcome than a rule based on negligence.255
CONCLUSION
Copyright false positives result in social harms that are often difficult to
detect, but are nonetheless widespread and pernicious in their effects.  The
indeterminacy of clear boundaries between copyright claims—the result of
minimal registration requirements and strong disincentives to litigation—
allow for rent-seeking by opportunistic copyright owners and corresponding
deadweight losses for licensees.  As a result, information, transaction, and
litigation costs for all participants in the copyright system are artificially
increased.  Moreover, attempts to push the lawful boundaries of copyright
protection via overly broad, and sometimes ostensibly bogus, claims result in
a public backlash.  This decreases respect for and adherence to copyright
law, and sets off a vicious downward spiral of increased piracy and increas-
ingly aggressive enforcement tactics.  In the process, labor and capital invest-
ments in creative enterprises are waylaid for fears of liability.  Finally, and
most dangerously, constitutionally protected speech rights are imperiled by
the deterioration of the “safety valves” (fair use and the idea/expression
dichotomy) that protect the First Amendment from the overexpansion of
intellectual property rights.
Much has been said about the risks that false negatives (i.e., under-deter-
rence) pose to livelihoods of authors, artists, and innovators, as well as the
business entities that provide compensation for their creative efforts.  But the
risks posed to these same groups by over-deterrence are too often over-
looked.  Therefore, recognition of the dangers of false positives is a necessary
complement to any policy discussion concerning reforms to the copyright
system.  While it would not be possible to eradicate all overly broad or erro-
neous claims, an overhaul of the copyright registration procedures and the
statutory entitlements that inure with registration would substantially
improve the chances of false positives being challenged in court and subse-
255 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975)
(discussing the effects different fault systems play in minimizing accidents); Guido Cala-
bresi & A. Douglas Melamad, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096–97 (1972) (arguing that the person who can best
avoid an accident should be held liable). But see Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Com-
ment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973) (arguing that strict liability is not the most economically
efficient rule).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 41 14-NOV-13 11:16
2013] copyright  false  positives 359
quently invalidated.  This, in turn, would help to slow the accretion of unjus-
tified claims and unscrupulous behavior by current right holders, and would
serve to better optimize the legal and normative incentives necessary to pro-
mote the future of Science and the Useful Arts.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 42 14-NOV-13 11:16
360 notre dame law review [vol. 89:1
